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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-CALIFORNIA TAKES A
HIT: THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY OVER
THE STATE-APPROVED USE OF MEDICINAL MARIJUANA. Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
I. INTRODUCTION
"[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel[,] social[,] and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country."'
The framers of the Constitution created a unique form of government
that distributed the power to govern between a central government and indi-
vidual state governments.2 In particular, the Constitution enumerates limited
powers to the federal government and provides that "[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively. . . ., This distribution of
power became known as "federalism."4 Traditionally, our federalist system
has recognized the states' police power to define criminal law and "protect
the health, safety, and welfare of [its] citizens." 5
Among the enumerated powers, the Constitution grants Congress the
authority to "regulate Commerce ... among the several states."6 Over the
past seventy years, this power has emerged as one of Congress's most im-
portant and apparent enumerated powers.7 In fact, from 1937 to 1995, the
Court did not strike down a single piece of congressional legislation as be-
yond Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.8 Then, in 1995, at a
point when Congress seemed to exercise unlimited authority pursuant to the
1. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Raich IV)
(citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
2. NEAL DEVINS & Louis FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 53-55 (2004).
3. UNITED STATES CONST. amend. X.
4. See WALTER B. MEAD, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: PERSONALITIES,
PRINCIPLES, AND ISSUES 92 (1987). John Calhoun first coined the term "federalism" in 1851
to describe the distribution of power in the United States. Id.
5. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. UNITED STATES CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
7. E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 1 (1981). Beginning in 1937, the Court began to abandon decisions requiring a
direct link to interstate commerce, focusing instead on whether the regulated activity had "a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce." Lamar F. Jost, Note, The Commerce
Clause in the New Millennium: Enumeration Still Presupposes Something Not Enumerated, 1
WYo L. REv. 195 (2000).
8. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 811-17 (3d ed.
2000).
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Commerce Clause, the Rehnquist Court relied on principles of federalism to
reestablish some limits on the scope of the commerce power.9 Characterized
as the "federalism revolution," many thought this would be the lasting leg-
acy of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.' ° In the Court's latest decision,
however, a 6-3 majority upheld the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) against
the intrastate cultivation of medicinal marijuana as within Congress's au-
thority under the Commerce Clause.1 By its decision in Gonzales v. Raich,12
the Court has cast doubt on whether it will continue this so-called "federal-
ism revolution," or whether the decision in United States v. Lopez13 will
prove to be nothing more than a hiccup in the growing expansion of the
Commerce Clause.
This note explores the significance of Raich to Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence. The note begins with an overview of the conflicting statutes,
facts, and procedural history that led the Court to its decision in Raich. 4
Next, the note examines the historical background of the Commerce Clause,
moving from the Court's initial interpretation and formalistic approaches, 5
through the Court's "New Deal" expansion, 6 and finally the Court's recent
attempt to reestablish some limitation based on federalism principles. 7 Fol-
lowing the historical background, the note explores the Court's analysis in
the Raich decision. 8 The note concludes with a discussion of the signifi-
cance of Raich, focusing on the impact of the Court's decision to the "feder-
alism revolution" and the future of the state-authorized use of medicinal
marijuana."
II. FACTS
The following section summarizes the facts that led to the Court's deci-
sion in Raich. First, this section will briefly outline the conflicting federal
and state statutes. 20 Next, this section will focus on the facts that led Angel
9. Herman Schwartz, A Deeply Rooted Revolution; U.S. Supreme Court Year in Review
2004-2005 Term; Despite Recent Decisions Contract to States' Rights, Rehnquist and
O'Connor's Federalism Legacy Will Thrive Long After They've Left, N.J. LAW JOURNAL, July
25,2005.
10. Linda Greenhouse, The Nation; The Rehnquist Court and Its Imperiled States'
Rights Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at Sec. 4, available at 2005 WLNR 9303554.
11. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 8-9.
12. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
13. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.A.-B.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Part III.D.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part II.A.
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Raich and Diane Monson into court. 2' Finally, this section tracks the proce-
dural history and ultimate grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court.22
A. Conflicting Statutory Schemes
1. Compassionate Use Act of 1996
In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 215, codified as the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 ("Act"),23 thereby becoming the first state
to authorize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.24 The Act ensured
that California residents suffering from a serious illness could obtain and use
marijuana for medicinal purposes.25 The Compassionate Use Act created an
exemption from criminal prosecution for patients and primary caregivers
who received the approval or recommendation of a physician, and the Act
specifically excluded from prosecution or persecution physicians who rec-
ommended marijuana to a patient.26 In 2003, as a result of uncertainties in
the enforcement and distribution of marijuana for medicinal purposes, the
California legislature amended the Compassionate Use Act for the purpose
of defining the scope of the Act and establishing a voluntary identification
system for users of medicinal marijuana.27
2. Controlled Substance Act
On October 27, 1970, President Nixon signed the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (CDAPCA) into law.28 Federal
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005).
24. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005) (Raich IV). California residents passed
Proposition 215 by a margin of fifty-six to forty-four percent. Hanna Rosin, The Return of
Pot: California Gears up for a Long, Strange Trip, NEW REPUBLiC, Feb. 17, 1997, at Al.
25. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A). Serious illnesses included
the following: "cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, mi-
graine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief." Id. The proposition also
encouraged the "federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe
and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana. Id. §
11362.5(b)(1)(C).
26. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(B)-(C).
27. See id. § 11362.7. For a general discussion on the amendments to the Compassion-
ate Use Act, see Tammy L. McCabe, Note, Health & Safety: It's High Time: California At-
tempts to Clear the Smoke Surrounding the Compassionate Use Act, 35 McGEORGE L. REv.
545 (2004).
28. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000); see also ROBERT L. BOGOMOLNY ET AL., A
HANDBOOK ON THE 1970 FEDERAL DRUG ACT: SHIFTING THE PERSPECTIVE 20 (1975). The
House of Representatives passed the Act by a vote of 341-6 on September 24, 1970; the
Senate amended and passed the Act by a vote of 54-0 on October 7, 1970. Id. at 19.
2006]
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legislators designed the CDAPCA to address the rapid growth of drug abuse
by providing (1) federal facilities to increase their efforts in drug abuse pre-
vention and rehabilitation, (2) a more effective means of law enforcement,
and (3) an "overall balanced scheme" of criminal penalties. 9
Title II of the CSA makes it illegal to knowingly or intentionally
"manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance," unless specifically author-
ized by the statute.3° In addition, under section 844(a), mere possession of a
controlled substance is illegal unless authorized by the CSA.3' A "controlled
substance" is any drug or substance classified in one of the five schedules
listed in section 812 of the CSA.32 Marijuana is designated as a Schedule I
controlled substance.33 To designate a controlled substance as Schedule I, it
must be found that the substance has a "high potential of abuse," "no cur-
rently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and "a lack
of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical su-
pervision. 3
4
Additionally, the CSA sets out specific Congressional findings and
declarations, which bear directly on Congress's authority under the Com-
merce Clause.3" The most relevant include the following:
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession
and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detri-
mental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.
29. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4567. In fact, prior to the reorganization of 1968, which merged the
Bureau of Narcotics of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control of
the Department of Health, Wealth, Education, and Welfare into a single agency under the
Department of Justice, two separate bodies of statutory law governed drug classification and
penalty structures-one based on the taxing power and the other on the commerce power.
BOGOMOLNY, supra note 28, at 16-17. Thus, one of the principal purposes of the CDAPCA
was to consolidate these inconsistent regulatory schemes. Id.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). The CDAPCA consisted of three titles. Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 n.19 (2005) (Raich IV). Title I governs the rehabilitation of drug ad-
dicts by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Title II governs the control and
enforcement of drugs by the Department of Justice; Title III governs the import and export of
controlled substances. Id.
31. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
32. Id. § 802(6).
33. Id. § 812(c)(10).
34. Id. § 812(b)(1).
35. Id. § 801.
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(3) Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate
or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession,
nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute
to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot
be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distrib-
uted interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls,
between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate
and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate.
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled




In 1996, California became the first of several states to enact a law au-
thorizing the limited use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.37 Angel Raich
and Diane Monson both resided in California and obtained marijuana as
recommended by their board-certified physicians, pursuant to the Act,3" to
alleviate several serious medical conditions.39 Angel Raich suffered from an
extensive list of medical conditions that included life-threatening weight
loss, severe chronic pain, and an inoperable brain tumor.4° As a result of her
condition, Raich was confined to a wheelchair and was unable to play an
active role in the parenting of her two children.4' Raich tried numerous
medications in an attempt to control the pain, but none alleviated her symp-
toms. 4 2 Her physician stated that she "[had] tried essentially all other legal
alternatives to cannabis[,] and the alternatives [had] been ineffective or re-
sult[ed] in intolerable side effects. 43 The pain became so unbearable that in
August of 1997, after her physician concluded that the pain could not be
36. Id. § 801.
37. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 n. 1 (2005) (Raich IV). Other states include Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.
Id.
38. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11362.5, later amended by §§ 11362.7-
11362.9. For a discussion of the Act, see Part II.A.1 of this note.
39. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 6-7.
40. Brief for Respondents at 4, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454).
41. Id.





relieved by any legally prescribed medications, Raich attempted to end her
own life." Upon her physician's recommendation, Raich began using mari-
juana, and her condition dramatically improved."
Diane Monson suffered from a degenerative disease of the spine that
caused chronic back pain and muscle spasms.6 Under the guidance of her
physician, also a board-certified practitioner, Monson tried several conven-
tional medications in an attempt to alleviate these symptoms." Because of
the severity of her condition and the lack of conventional alternatives, Mon-
son's physician determined "that medical [marijuana] use [was] deemed
appropriate for Diane Monson, and that medical [marijuana] provide[d] nec-
essary relief for Diane's pain and suffering." '4 Monson began using mari-
juana, which substantially relieved her back pain and muscle spasms.49
Angel Raich and Diane Monson used marijuana cultivated entirely
within California.5" Furthermore, they contended that none of the products
necessary for the cultivation of marijuana originated out-of-state.5 Diane
Monson grew her own marijuana, which she ingested by smoking or using a
vaporizer.52 Angel Raich, however, was unable to cultivate her own mari-
juana; instead, she relied on two caregivers to produce and provide the mari-
juana at no charge.53
On August 15, 2002, agents from the DEA and deputies from the Butte
County Sheriff s Department investigated the home of Diane Monson.54 The
county deputies determined that Monson's use of marijuana was legal under
the Compassionate Use Act.5 The United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of California, however, pursuant to the CSA,56 ordered DEA agents
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. After the introduction of marijuana for pain treatment, it was no longer necessary
for Raich to use a wheelchair. Id.
46. Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 5.
47. Id. at 5-6.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id.
50. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 7 (2005) (Raich IV).
51. Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 6.
52. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 7.
53. Id. Raich processed the marijuana into a variety of items including oils, balms, and
food. Id.
54. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2003) (Raich fl), rev'd, Gonza-
les v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Law enforcement agents targeted Monson's home after an
aircraft flyover revealed her marijuana garden. NPR: News & Notes (National Public Radio
broadcast, June 7, 2005) (transcript on file with the University ofArkansas at Little Rock Law
Review).
55. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 7.
56. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2005). For a general discussion of the Controlled Substance Act
see supra Part II.A.2.
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to confiscate and destroy six of her marijuana plants.57 To avoid future con-
fiscation and to protect their future use of marijuana for medicinal purposes,
on October 9, 2002, Angel Raich, Diane Monson, and two unnamed parties
(collectively Respondents), filed suit against the United States Attorney
General, John Ashcroft, and the Administrator of the DEA, Asa Hutchin-
son.58 Respondents sought a preliminary and permanent injunction against
the enforcement of the CSA as it applies to the manufacture, distribution, or
possession of marijuana for their personal medical use.59 Respondents
claimed that the enforcement of the CSA was an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power, violating the Commerce Clause, the Fifth Amendment,
the Ninth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.6"
They also claimed that the medicinal use of marijuana was legal under the
doctrine of medical necessity."
C. The Procedural History
On March 5, 2003, the District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia denied Respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction.62 The dis-
trict court concluded that, under the law of the Ninth Circuit, Respondents
were unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits on their mo-
tion for injunctive relief.63 The court was unwilling to distinguish the me-
dicinal use of marijuana from prior Ninth Circuit decisions that upheld the
CSA as a valid constitutional use of the commerce power.' In addition, the
district court determined that the CSA does not violate the Ninth or Tenth
57. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1226. Prior to the confiscation of Monson's marijuana plants,
local officials attempted to exclude federal intervention, resulting in a three-hour standoff
between the Butte County District Attorney and the United States District Attorney. Id.
58. Id. The two unnamed litigants, known as "John Does," were the caregivers that
provided Angel Raich with locally grown marijuana. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 7.
59. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 7.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id. The defense of necessity "traditionally covered the situation [in which] physical
forces beyond the actor's control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils." United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer's Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (citing United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980)). Prior to the passage of the Compassionate Use Act, the Su-
preme Court considered whether the doctrine of medical necessity could be applied to a pa-
tient using marijuana for medicinal purposes pursuant to a California initiative. Id. at 491.
The Court held that the doctrine of necessity is not applicable when the legislature has made a
"determination on the values." Id. Therefore, because Congress declared that marijuana did
not have any medicinal use, the doctrine of medical necessity could not be applied. Id. at 492.
62. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (Raich 1), rev'd, 352
F.3d 1222 (2003), rev'd, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 925 (citing United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.




Amendments and that Respondents could not invoke the doctrine of medical
necessity."
On appeal, a split Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the
district court for entry of a preliminary injunction.6 Specifically, the court
held that Respondents had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the mer-
its of their claim that, as related to their narrow class of activity, the CSA
was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power.67 Unlike
the district court, the Ninth Circuit distinguished its prior case law on the
ground that the medicinal use of marijuana constituted a "separate and dis-
tinct class of activities., 68 The court relied on United States v. Lope 69 and
United States v. Morrison" to determine whether this narrow class of activ-
ity substantially affected interstate commerce.7' Applying the four-factor test
from Morrison,72 the court held that the Respondents' use of marijuana was
neither commercial nor economic. In addition, the court held that the CSA
contained no jurisdictional element to limit the reach of the statute and that
the link between the use of medicinal marijuana and its effect on commerce
was attenuated.74 The court agreed with the district court that the public in-
terest and hardship factors weighed in Respondents' favor, and, thus, cou-
pled with the likelihood of success on the merits, the facts warranted the
entry of a preliminary injunction.75 On June 28, 2004, the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari."
65. Id. at 926-30.
66. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2003) (Raich fl). For an in-depth
discussion of the Raich H1 decision, see Samantha Everett, Note, Raich v. Ashcroft: Medical
Marijuana and the Revival of Federalism, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1873 (2004).
67. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1227.
68. Id. at 1228.
69. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
70. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
71. Raich II, 352 F.3d at 1229-34.
72. Id. at 1229. The four-factor test for determining whether an activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, as clarified in Morrison, includes the following: "(1) whether the
statute regulates commerce or any sort of economic enterprise; (2) whether the statute con-
tains [an] express jurisdictional element ... ; (3) whether the statute .. .contains 'express
congressional findings' regarding the effects of the regulated activity ... ; and (4) whether
the link between the regulated activity and a substantial effect ... is 'attenuated."' Id. (citing
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1229-34. The court did determine that the third element weighed in favor of
the CSA's constitutionality; however, when weighing the factors, the court considered the
first and fourth factors to be the most important. Id at 1232.
75. Id. at 1234.




By 1787, in the midst of competing economic interests," the Articles of
Confederation-our nation's first constitution-proved lacking in the cen-
tralized authority necessary to control commerce among the states.78 Fearful
that these competing economic interests would lead to the ultimate dissolu-
tion of the union, state delegates assembled in Philadelphia to revise the
powers of the national government.79 On September 17, 1787, after months
of debate, the convention created a new framework of government 8°-The
Constitution of the United States.81 The Constitution grants enumerated
powers to the central government and reserves the remaining power to the
states.82 James Madison stated as follows: "The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and in-
definite." 83 In 1791, the First Continental Congress amended the Constitu-
tion to expressly adopt this implicit assumption that powers not specifically
granted to the central government would be "reserved to the [s]tates. 84
Among those enumerated powers, the Constitution grants Congress the
authority to "regulate Commerce ... among the several states. 85 In drafting
this seemingly broad clause, the convention neither defined the purpose nor
77. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.3, at 413 (3d ed. 1999). As a result of the struggling market,
individual states imposed economic sanctions against out-of-state products and taxed im-
ported goods destined for other states. Id.
78. Id. at 412. The framers of the Articles of Confederation feared centralized authority
over commerce and, therefore, granted the national government no power to regulate com-
merce among the states and only a limited power to regulate international affairs. Id
79. Id. at 413. This assembly would later be known as the "Constitutional Convention."
Id.
80. See MEAD, supra note 4, at 90. At the time of the convention, the vast majority of
political systems consisted of one governing body with concentrated powers, commonly
called "unitary" or "centralized" government. Id. at 89-91. While a few European countries
maintained a "confederacy," that is, a loose association of states that delegate limited powers
to a central governing body, none of the European countries balanced the powers between the
two governing bodies. Id.
81. Id. at 111-49. Although the convention adopted the Constitution in September of
1787, the state ratification process did not end until March of 1789 and was amended thereaf-
ter by the Bill of Rights. Id.
82. Id. at 93.
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
84. UNITED STATES CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." Id.
85. UNITED STATES CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The United States Constitution also grants




the scope of this power as it related to the states.86 Therefore, the Constitu-
tion left the task of determining the purpose, meaning, and the scope of con-
gressional authority, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to the United States
Supreme Court. 7 The following sections will survey significant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence in the United States.18 The first section will examine
the initial interpretation of the Commerce Clause and the subsequent juris-
prudence prior to 1886.89 The second section will examine the Court's for-
malistic and restrictive approach to the commerce power from 1887 to
1936.90 The next section examines the Supreme Court's decisions from 1937
to 1995, which abandoned the formalistic restriction of the commerce power
in favor of the broad approach suggested in Gibbons v. Ogden.9' Finally, the
last section will explore the Commerce Clause jurisprudence from 1995 to
2005 and the Court's recent attempts to limit federal authority under the
commerce power.
92
A. The Early Interpretation of the Commerce Power
The Court first interpreted the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v.
Ogden.93 In Gibbons, New York enacted legislation granting a steamboat
monopoly to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton, who in turn, granted
the monopoly to Aaron Ogden.94 Thomas Gibbons, a coastal trader, ran two
steamboats between New York and New Jersey, which violated this exclu-
sive privilege.95 Ogden sought and obtained an injunction against Gibbons.96
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice John
Marshall, held that the state statute conflicted with a legitimate federal stat-
ute and was, therefore, invalid.97 Despite this narrow holding, Chief Justice
86. ROTUNDA, supra note 77, at 414.
87. Id.
88. See infra Part III.A.-D.
89. See infra Part lI.A.
90. See infra Part III.B.
91. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see also infra Part III.C.
92. See infra Part III.D.
93. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-97.
94. Id. at 7-8. The legislation granted "exclusive navigation of all the waters within the
jurisdiction of [New York], with boats moved by fire or steam, for a term of years which has
not yet expired; and authoriz[ed] the Chancellor to award an injunction, restraining any
[other] person... from.., those waters with boats of that description." Id. at 2.
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id. at 7. The federal statute enacted guidelines for the enrollment, licensing, and
regulation of coastal trading and fishing. Id. at 1.
97. Id. at 210; see also UNITED STATES CONST. art. 6, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
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Marshall, in dicta, discussed the scope of federal authority over commerce."
The commerce power, he stated, "is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than [those that]
are prescribed in the constitution."99 The power extended to commercial
"intercourse" affecting "more States than one" and "cannot stop at the ex-
ternal boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the inte-
rior."' 00 Congress shall exercise plenary power over commerce, subject only
to political restraints.'0 ' According to Chief Justice Marshall, the only com-
mercial activities not subject to this federal power were those activities
"which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other
States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere."' 2
Despite Chief Justice Marshall's exposition on the breadth of federal
power over commerce, prior to 1887, few legislative acts relied on Con-
gress's power to regulate commerce, and, as a result, there were even fewer
judicial decisions interpreting the commerce power as an affirmative con-
gressional power.' °3 On the contrary, the majority of the Court's decisions
concerned the Commerce Clause as a limitation on state legislation that af-
fected interstate commerce. °4 Following Gibbons, until 1887, the Court's
sparse Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been characterized as "inconsis-
tent doctrinal themes."' 5 Some of the decisions, like Gibbons, suggested
that the primary limitation on federal authority over commerce should be
political rather than judicial.0 6 On the other hand, the Court began to make
formal distinctions that would later limit congressional authority pursuant to
the Commerce Clause. 1
07
98. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97.
99. Id. at 196.
100. Id. at 189, 194.
101. Id. at 197. "The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the peo-
ple, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many
other instances .... the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its
abuse." Id.
102. Id. at 195.
103. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 808-09.
104. Id. at 809-10.
105. Id. at 808 n.6.
106. Id.; see also, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871) (holding, over an
objection that the Commerce Clause granted Congress a limitless power, that Congress could
regulate the licensing of ships operating exclusively within the state if the transported goods
were ultimately destined for other states); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560
(1850) (holding that the commerce clause, which, once conceded, "may operate on any and
every subject of commerce to which the legislative discretion may apply it," granted Con-
gress the authority to prohibit the importation of counterfeit coins).
107. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 809 n.6; see also, e.g., United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 41 (1870). For the first time, in United States v. Dewitt, the Court held that Congress
had exceeded its authority granted by the Commerce Clause. Id. at 44-45. The Court invali-
dated a legislative act that prohibited the sale of naphtha or other illuminating oils flammable
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B. 1887-1937: A Formalistic Approach to Restricting the Commerce
Clause
In 1887, Congress began enacting legislation, pursuant to the com-
merce power, designed to resolve economic and social problems that devel-
oped as a result of the Industrial Revolution. 0 8 Consequently, the Supreme
Court began deciding cases involving the Commerce Clause as an affirma-
tive grant of congressional power, as opposed to the previous period in
which it was considered a limit on state legislative power. 9 Unlike Chief
Justice Marshall's broad definition of "commerce," the Court confined the
term "commerce" to trade or exchange, as distinguished from economic
activities such as "manufacturing," "mining," and "production."" ° For ex-
ample, in United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,"' the Supreme Court held that
the Sherman Antitrust Act could not restrict the American Sugar Refining
Company from acquiring almost complete control of the manufacture of
refined sugar within the United States." 2 The Court distinguished "com-
merce" from "manufacture," stating that "[c]ommerce succeeds to manufac-
ture, and is not a part of it.""' 3
In 1936, the Supreme Court held the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1935, which Congress enacted to govern various aspects of the coal-
mining industry, was beyond Congress's authority pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause.' The Court distinguished commerce from manufacturing,
at a temperature less than 110 degrees Fahrenheit. Id. The Court concluded that "[w]ithin
State limits, [Congress] can have no constitutional operation." Id. at 45.
108. See ROTUNDA, supra note 77, § 4.5 at 422. By the late nineteenth century, advances
in industrial technology had sparked the growth of modem-day, industrial cities. CHARLES A.
BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 393-01 (H. Wolff Book
Mfg. Co. 1944). These cities, however, became breeding grounds for poverty, disease, and
industrial accidents. Id. at 394. As a result, a social movement occurred, which sought to
improve conditions, such as factory sanitation and safety, compensation for workers, and the
control of contagious diseases. Id. at 396.
109. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 810. For a comprehensive list of cases involving the Com-
merce Clause prior to 1937, see Tribe, supra note 8, at 810 n.8.
110. Id. at 810. "[This] half century is usually remembered as one in which the Court
repeatedly struck down congressional action as unauthorized under the Commerce Clause."
Id. at 810 n.8.
111. 156U.S. 1(1895).
112. Id. at 17; see also Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21 (1888) (holding that if the Court
defined "commerce" to include those manufactured goods that might, in the future, be subject
to commercial transactions, then "[C]ongress would be invested ... with the power to regu-
late, not only manufacture, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock-raising, domestic fisheries,
mining,-in short, every branch of human industry").
113. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 12.
114. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936). The Court reasoned as follows:
"[T]he incidents leading up to and culminating in the mining of coal do not constitute...
intercourse. The employment of men, the fixing of their wages, hours of labor, and working
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holding that Congress could regulate only the former." 5 The Court reasoned
that "[t]he regulation of commerce applies to the subjects of commerce, and
not to matters of internal police."
'' 16
The Court continued its restrictive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause throughout the first several years of President Franklin D. Roose-
velt's "New Deal."".7 For example, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States,"8 the Court held that the Live Poultry Code, a provision of
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, was an unconstitutional exer-
cise of congressional authority under the commerce power." 9 The Court
determined that the activities regulated were intrastate' z and had only an
"indirect" effect on interstate commerce.' By making this distinction, the
Court established the "direct effects" test for determining the scope of the
commerce power as it related to intrastate activity. 12 Activities that "di-
rectly" affected interstate commerce fell within the federal government's
authority; whereas, activities that had an "indirect" effect on interstate com-
merce "remain[ed] within the domain of state power."' 23
conditions . . .each and all constitute intercourse for the purposes of production, not of
trade." Id. at 303.
115. Id. at 299-301. The Court defined commerce as "intercourse for the purposes of
trade" and defined manufacturing as the transformation of raw materials into finished prod-
ucts. Id. at 299, 303. The Court also rejected the notion that the manufactured coal could be
introduced to the interstate market at a later time. Id. at 299.
116. Id.at301.
117. See ROTUNDA, supra note 77, § 4.7 at 433-37; see also, e.g., R.R. Retirement v.
Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 because
the Act was designed to help "the social welfare of the worker" and was not related to an
aspect of interstate commerce). President Roosevelt designed this "New Deal" legislation in
an attempt to stabilize an economy shattered by the Great Depression. See BEARD, supra note
108, at 452-57. An estimated twelve million Americans became unemployed as a result of
the Depression. Id. at 452.
118. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
119. Id. at 550. The purpose of the legislation was to regulate the wages, hours, admini-
stration, trade practice, and general labor provisions of the poultry industry. Id at 523-24.
120. Id. at 542-43. Although the government contended that the regulated products came
from other states, the Court held that once the products were delivered to the state, the "flow
in interstate commerce had ceased" and "had come to a permanent rest within the state." Id.
at 543.
121. Id. at 550.
122. See id. at 546.
123. Id. The Court reasoned that if "indirect" activities were within the federal authority it
"would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the authority of the state over
its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government." Id.
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C. 1937-1995: Out with the Old, in with the New-The "New Deal" Ex-
pansion of the Commerce Clause
Despite the Supreme Court's unwillingness to broaden federal author-
ity, President Roosevelt, after his reelection in 1936, continued to pursue his
legislative reforms. 124 In February of 1937, in an attempt to reconfigure the
Court, President Roosevelt introduced legislation that would authorize him
to appoint an additional judge for every current judge who was over seventy
years of age and had served on the court for at least ten years.'25 If enacted,
the United States Supreme Court would have grown from nine justices to
fifteen.'26 Although his opponents defeated the Court Packing Plan, Presi-
dent Roosevelt won the war. 127 The Court abandoned the formalistic inter-
pretation of the Commerce Clause and began to expand its scope.' Within
the text of the Commerce Clause, the Court recognized three categories of
activity within Congress's authority. 29 Under its commerce power, Con-
gress could regulate the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce, and those activities that affect interstate com-
merce. 30 The following sections explore the Court's adoption and interpre-
tation of the third category.
1 31
1. The "Substantial Effects" Test
The 1937 decision, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., prompted
a new line of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. '1 Despite a Commerce
Clause challenge, the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act. 34 In
124. See ROTUNDA, supra note 77, § 4.7 at 433. In a 1937 address, President Roosevelt
"described the national government as 'a three horse team' of Congress, the President, and
the courts. Two of the horses 'are pulling in unison, the third is not."' DEvINS, supra note 2,
at 61.
125. ROTUNDA, supra note 77, at 433, 438. President Roosevelt's bill later became known
as the "Court Packing Plan." Id. at 433.
126. Id. at 438. Six justices were over the age of seventy at the time President Roosevelt
introduced the bill. Id.
127. Id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 8, at 811-12 (suggesting that the combination of
political pressure and the "doctrine's growing irrelevance" led the Court to abandon its for-
malistic approach).
128. ROTUNDA, supra note 77, at 438.
129. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). The Court first recognized these
three categories in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
130. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
131. See infra Part III.C.1. -2.
132. 301 U.S. 1(1937).
133. TRIBE,supra note 8, at 811-17.
134. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37. Congress enacted the National Labor Relations
Act to protect employees from "unfair labor practices" and set forth a right for employees to
self-organize and bargain collectively through representatives. Id. at 22-24. The National
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doing so, the Court departed from the "direct" and "indirect" effects test and
held, instead, that "[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied
the power to exercise control."' 35 The Jones & Laughlin holding would be-
come the foundation of the "substantial effects" test.'36
The Supreme Court's expansion of federal authority under the Com-
merce Clause continued in Wickard v. Filburn 37 To avoid irregularities in
pricing that could obstruct commerce, the federal government enacted the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which regulated the volume of wheat
produced annually in order to control the market. 3 After being penalized
for the overproduction of wheat, Mr. Filbum, the owner and operator of a
small farm, contested the Act as an unconstitutional exercise of the com-
merce power. 39 Even though Mr. Filburn's wheat cultivation was a purely
intrastate activity, the Court upheld the legislation based on the principle of
aggregation. 4 ' The Court stated "[t]hat [Mr. Filburn's] own contribution to
the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."'' 41
Thus, the Court further expanded the scope of the commerce power to in-
clude those trivial activities that, when considered alone, have little impact
on commerce, but, when "aggregated," can "exert[] a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce."'' 42 In addition, the Wickard Court expressly
Labor Relations Board found that the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation had violated the
Act by discriminating against members of the union and coercing its employees to disrupt
and discontinue their self-organization. Id. at 22.
135. Id.; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that Congress's
authority "extends to those activities intrastate [that] so affect interstate commerce or the
exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to
the attainment of a legitimate end").
136. ROTUNDA, supra note 77, § 4.8 at 446.
137. 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also TRIBE, supra note 8, at 813.
138. Wickard, 317U.S. at 116.
139. Id. at 118. The federal statute allotted farmers roughly 223 bushels of wheat on a
maximum of 11.1 acres of land; however, Mr. Filburn harvested approximately 462 bushels
of wheat. Id. at 113.
140. Id. at 127-28.
141. Id. The Court reasoned that a farmer, influenced by the rising market price of wheat,
could sell his excess wheat and ultimately frustrate the balance of the market. Id In sum, the
excess wheat competes with wheat produced for interstate commerce. Id.
142. Id. at 125; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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rejected the previous distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects on
interstate commerce. 1
43
The Court's expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause contin-
ued in 1971 when the Court upheld federal regulation of intrastate criminal
activity. 144 The Court sustained Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 145 which made it unlawful to collect on an extension of credit by extor-
tion, violence, or other criminal means.'46 After the introduction of extensive
evidence, a district court found Perez, a local "loan shark," guilty under this
federal statute. 47 The Court recognized that Perez's activity occurred purely
intrastate; however, the Court held that "[when] the class of activities is
regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have
no power to 'excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class."'' 48 Con-
gress provided ample evidence to support its claim that loan sharking, which
occurred purely intrastate, could be associated with interstate crime.'
49
2. The Rational Basis Standard
In addition to the "substantial effect" and "aggregation" principles, the
Court began to defer to congressional findings regarding whether an activity
has an effect on interstate commerce 50 For example, in Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States,'I' the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a
valid exercise of the commerce power.' In doing so, the Court relied on
143. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. "But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still.., be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce... irrespective of whether such effect ... [has] been
defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."' Id.
144. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 891 (2000).
146. Perez, 402 U.S. at 147. The statute included extortionate transactions that occurred
interstate and intrastate. Id. at 148 n. 1.
147. Id. at 148. The prosecution introduced testimony from two witnesses claiming that
Perez loaned money and then used violence to encourage repayment. Id
148. Id. at 154 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
149. Id. at 155. Congress conducted several studies that showed that loan sharking took
large amounts of money from America's poor and was commonly controlled by interstate
crime syndicates. Id. at 155-56.
150. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 814; see also, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S. 146; Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
151. 379 U.S. 241. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the owner and operator of a motel in Geor-
gia-who refused to rent rooms to African Americans-challenged the constitutionality of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was enacted for the purpose of "eliminating
discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in ... public accommoda-
tions." Id. at 245.
152. Id. at 258.
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Congressional findings in determining whether the local operation of a mo-
tel would affect interstate commerce.'53 The Court concluded that "[t]he
commerce power invoked here ... is a specific and plenary one [and] ...
[t]he only questions [for the Court] are: (1) whether Congress had a rational
basis ... and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means ... are reasonable
and appropriate."'' 54 Similar to Heart of America Motel, in Katzenbach v.
McClung,'55 the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the Com-
merce Clause. 56 The Court reasoned, "[W]here we find that the legislators,
in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for find-
ing a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce,
our investigation is at an end."
'157
By combining the "substantial effect" and "aggregation" principles and
by relying on the Court's deference to congressional findings, Congress
enacted a wide range of legislation designed to deal with the social and eco-
nomic problems of the twentieth century. 5 The Court upheld legislation
regulating civil rights 59 and criminal law. 60 However, as Professor Tribe
pointed out, these principles "placed [the Court] in the increasingly unten-
able position of claiming the power to strike down invocations of the Com-
merce Clause, while at the same time applying a set of doctrines that made it
virtually impossible actually to exercise this power. 
''61
D. 1995-2005: The Rehnquist Court-Limitations of Congressional
Commerce Clause Power
By 1995, Congress's power to regulate activities under the Commerce
Clause appeared limitless.1 62 From 1937 to 1955 the Court did not strike
153. Id. at 257. Specifically, the Court relied on congressional findings supporting the
theory that racial discrimination would have a disruptive influence on interstate commerce.
Id.
154. Id. at 259. The Court, quoting Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons, stated that "[t]he
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence [that]
their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances . . .the sole
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse." Id. at 255 (quoting Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,197 (1824)).
155. 379 U.S. 294.
156. Id. at 304. In Katzenbach, the owner and operator of a restaurant, Ollie McClung,
Sr., sought to enjoin the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act, thereby allowing him to refuse
service on the basis of race. Id. at 296.
157. Id. at 303-04. The Court concluded that Congress appropriately found that racial
discrimination would have an adverse effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 304.
158. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 815.
159. See, e.g., Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 294; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241.
160. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).




down a single piece of legislation as an unconstitutional exercise of the
commerce power.'63 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist was among a grow-
ing number of people who were unsettled by the federal government's broad
authority over all activities."6 In previous decisions, Chief Justice Rehnquist
expressed his discomfort with the New Deal expansion of the Commerce
Clause.'65 Chief Justice Rehnquist finally mobilized the Court in 1995 to
rein in on Congress's commerce power.'66
In 1995, the Court, through Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), which made it a federal crime to
knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone, exceeded Congress's author-
ity under the Commerce Clause.'67 The Court recognized that Congress,
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, had the authority to regulate "those ac-
tivities that substantially affect interstate commerce. "168 The Court, however,
reaffirmed the idea that the commerce power must be subject to some "outer
limits.' 69 Thus, the Court reformulated the rule for determining the scope of
the commerce power according to the "substantial effects" test. 70 "Where
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regu-
lating that activity will be sustained.''. If the legislation "has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise" and "is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated," then
that activity is beyond congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause.172 The GFSZA regulated an activity that was purely intrastate; there-
163. Id.
164. Id. at 817.
165. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 310 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (warning that "it would be a mistake to conclude that
Congress's power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause is unlimited"); see also
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
166. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 817.
167. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). The statute made it a crime to
"possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is
a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)
(1996). The term "school zone" is defined as "in, or on the grounds of a ... school" or
"within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a. .. school." Id. § 921(a)(25).
168. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
169. Id. at 557. The commerce power "must be considered in light of our dual system of
government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that ... [it] would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local .. " Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 37 (1937)).
170. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 817-23.
171. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added). The Court reconciled this reformulation of
the rule by showing that the Court's New Deal decisions relied on this economic distinction,
at least through implication, when determining a federal statute's constitutionality. Id. at 559.
172. Id. at 560.
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fore, to invoke the "substantial effects" and "aggregation" principles, the
activity itself would have to be economic in nature.'73 Because the posses-
sion of a firearm in a school zone was not an economic activity, the Court
held that it was beyond Congress's constitutional authority under the Com-
merce Clause.
174
In addition, the GFSZA did not contain a jurisdictional element, which
would limit its scope by requiring an explicit connection with interstate
commerce.'75 Nor were there any legislative or congressional committee
findings to support Congress's determination that this activity, knowingly
possessing a firearm in a school zone, would affect interstate commerce.'7 6
In defense of the GFSZA, the government argued that this local activity
could affect interstate commerce.'77 The government argued that violent
crime related to the possession of a gun near a classroom would affect the
economy by (1) raising the costs of insurance, which would be spread
throughout the population, and (2) discouraging tourism. 7 8 The Court, how-
ever, refused to adopt the Government's contention."' The majority con-
cluded by stating the following:
173. Id.
174. Id. at 567. The Court reasoned that if the possession of a firearm in a school zone
was "economic," then it would be difficult to exclude federal authority over any area of activ-
ity. Id. The Court admitted that the ultimate determination of whether an intrastate activity
was economic or non-economic would create uncertainty in the law. Id. at 566. In his dissent,
Justice Breyer articulated three instances in which gun-related violent crimes near a school
could create an economic threat. Id. at 623 (Breyer, J., dissenting). These threats could bring
about a decline in the quality of education, which would produce "inadequately educated
workers" and a work force unprepared for the challenges of expanding technologies. Id.
175. Id. at 562. "[A] 'jurisdictional element,' the term used to refer to a statutory clause
(such as 'in or affecting interstate commerce') . .. limits [a] statute to those instances [in
which] the ... possession is shown to be related to interstate commerce." United States v.
Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 285 (3d Cir. 1996). Subsequent to the Court's decision in Lopez, the
statute was amended to include a jurisdictional element. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)
(2000). The federal statute now reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or for-
eign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone." Id.
176. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. "While 'Congress normally is not required to make formal
findings... ,' the existence of such findings may 'enable us to evaluate the legislative judg-
ment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate commerce, even though no
such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye."' United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 612 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563) (citations omitted).
177. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 567. "To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States." Id.
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Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that
road, giving great deference to congressional action. The broad language
in these [prior] opinions has suggested the possibility of additional ex-
pansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would re-
quire us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does
not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. 180
The Court further limited congressional power in 2000 when it held
that the Violence Against Women Act .of 1994 (VAWA),' 8' which was de-
signed to provide a civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence, ex-
ceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 8 2 The Court, fol-
lowing Lopez, held that "[w]here economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.'
' 83
Therefore, the Court "reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate
non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's ag-
gregate effect on interstate commerce.'
' 84
In addition, VAWA, like the GFSZA in Lopez, lacked a jurisdictional
element; however, unlike Lopez, Congress provided extensive findings re-
garding the activities' effect on interstate commerce. 88 The Court, based on
the same concerns as expressed in Lopez, reasoned that these findings, if
accepted, "would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the na-
tionwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on em-
ployment, production, transit, or consumption."'8 6 Thus, the Court rejected
the "but-for" causal chain that Congress used to reach its conclusions as
expressed in the congressional findings.
8 7
180. Id. (citations omitted).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), held unconstitutional by Morrison v. State, 529 U.S. 598
(2000). The statute provided a civil remedy against "[a] person (including a person who acts
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits
a crime of violence motivated by gender, and thus, deprives another of the right declared in
subsection (b)." Id. § 13981(c). Under subsection (b), "[a]ll persons within the United States
shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender." Id. § 13981(b).
182. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598; see also JOST, supra note 7.
183. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).
184. Id. at 617.
185. Id. at 613-14. Congress found that gender-based violence impacted interstate com-
merce by (1) discouraging potential victims from traveling, (2) increasing medical and insur-
ance costs, (3) discouraging interstate employment, and (4) decreasing the supply and de-
mand of interstate products. Id. at 615.
186. Id. at 615.
187. Id. If the Court accepted these findings, "Congress might use the Commerce Clause




On June 6, 2005, Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court,
which upheld the constitutionality of Congress's authority to prohibit the
local cultivation and use of marijuana as permitted by California law. 8' Jus-
tices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in the opinion.'89 Justice
Scalia filed a separate opinion in which he concurred in the majority's
judgment.90 On the other hand, Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, and Justice Thomas joined as to all
but Part III. '9 In addition, Justice Thomas filed a separate dissenting opin-
ion. 192
The following section explores the reasoning of the Court.'93 The first
subsection focuses on the majority opinion, including both Justice Steven's
majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion.94 The second sub-




1. Justice Stevens's Majority Opinion
The majority framed the underlying issue in Gonzales v. Raich as
whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when
it prohibited the local use and cultivation of marijuana in compliance with
state law. 196 Initially, the majority traced the history of drug enforcement
and, in particular, the regulation of marijuana in the United States.'97 The
majority then discussed the passage of the CSA and the subsequent classifi-
cation of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance. 9 8 The Court noted
the unsuccessful legal and legislative campaign to reclassify marijuana as a
Schedule II substance. 99
188. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (Raich IV).
189. Id. at4.
190. Id. at 33-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 42-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 57-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
193. See infra Part IV.A.-B.
194. See infra Part W.A.
195. See infra Part IV.B.
196. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 5, 9. The majority recognized the seriousness of the Respon-
dents' conditions but stated that "[w]ell-settled law controls [the Court's] answer." Id. at 9.
197. Id. at 10-12. Marijuana was first regulated by taxation, and the possession of mari-
juana was not completely prohibited until the enactment of the CSA. Id. at 11-14.
198. Id. at 12-15.
199. Id. at 15 n.23.
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After summarizing the history of the CSA, the majority discussed the
Respondents' challenge, which was characterized as "quite limited." 20 The
Respondents did not dispute the passage of the entire CSA or any section
thereof as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power, but
rather, they argued that the prohibition of marijuana as applied to the purely
local cultivation and possession, pursuant to California law, exceeded Con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause.20 ' After articulating the
Respondents' argument, the majority traced the history of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, focusing on those cases that implicated Congress's authority
to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.2 2
a. Wickard v. Filburn
The majority's analysis focused on an earlier decision, Wickard v. Fil-
burn,203 referring to it as being of "particular relevance. ' 2 4 After briefly
summarizing the facts, the majority stated that Wickard "establishes that
Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commer-
cial' ... if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would
undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity. 20 5 The
Court also recognized its adoption of the "aggregation principle" in
Wickard.2 °6 Next, the majority compared the Raich facts with Wickard, con-
cluding that the cases' similarities were almost indistinguishable. 207 For ex-
ample, like the farmer in Wickard, respondents cultivated a fungible com-
modity that had an established interstate market, and, in addition, Congress
designed both of the federal statutes to regulate the supply and demand of
that commodity. 208 Also, in both situations, Congress had a rational basis to
believe that intrastate cultivation, when viewed in the aggregate, could have
a substantial influence on interstate market conditions and prices.2" Like
Wickard, the high demand and rising prices of the commodity, be it wheat or
marijuana, could draw the commodity into the interstate market, and, in the
200. Id. at 15.
201. Id.
202. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 13-18. For a survey of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see
supra Part IV.
203. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
204. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 17.
205. Id. at 18. The Court in Wickard upheld the regulation of wheat production, despite
the argument that this production was not intended for commerce, but instead, was com-
pletely local in nature. Id. For a more detailed description of the facts, see supra Part Ill.
206. See id. at 18.
207. Id. at 18-19.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 19.
[Vol. 28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
alternative, the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes could frustrate the
goal of eliminating the interstate market of marijuana in its entirety.21,
Next, the majority addressed the Respondents' argument that Wickard
could be distinguished because (1) the federal statute in Wickard provided
an exclusion, (2) the production of wheat, unlike the Respondents' use of
marijuana, was commercial in nature, and (3) Congress made specific find-
ings in Wickard, concluding that the aggregation of wheat would have a
significant impact on the market.21' The Court dispensed with each of the
respondents' claims.' First, it pointed out that the exemption for smaller
farmers did not play a role in the Court's decision in Wickard.213 Second,
although Wickard involved a commercial farmer, the Court was asked to
address the home consumption of wheat; thus, the Court did not treat the
home production as a commercial operation. 214 Finally, the congressional
findings as expressed in the CSA were "fully comparable" to those congres-
sional findings expressed in Wickard.215 The Court's role is not to determine
whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce but, instead, to
determine whether there was a "rational basis" for so concluding. 216 Because
of the enforcement difficulties and the possibility that the marijuana could
be diverted into illicit channels, the majority held that Congress had a "ra-
tional basis" for believing that the regulation of the intrastate cultivation
would be necessary to effectuate the goals of prohibiting the interstate dis-
tribution and possession of marijuana.2 7 It concluded that, like in Wickard,
Congress acted within its authority to "make laws which shall be necessary
and proper" to "regulate Commerce ... among the several states" when it
enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme that also encompasses some
purely intrastate activities.28
b. The Lopez and Morrison decisions
Next, Justice Stevens analyzed the Respondents' reliance upon the
Court's recent decisions establishing limits on Congress's authority under
210. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 19. For a comparison of the Wickard findings, see supra note
141.
211. Id. at20.
212. Id. at 20-21.
213. Id. at 20.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 20-21.
216. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 22 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995);
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-80 (1981); Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-





the Commerce Clause.219 Justice Stevens pointed out two flaws in their ar-
gument: (1) Respondents failed to recognize that the recent Commerce
Clause jurisprudence preserved earlier decisions, and (2) even if recent
Court decisions overruled prior case law, the Respondents read those deci-
sions too broadly.220
First, the majority distinguished both Lopez and Morrison because in
those cases the parties asserted that the entire statute or provision fell out-
side Congress's commerce power, as opposed to Respondents in Raich who
argued that their specific class of activity should be excluded as beyond
Congress's commerce power.22' Next, the majority pointed out several fac-
tors that distinguished the Lopez holding.222 The Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990 was a brief, single-subject statute that did not regulate an economic
activity and was not based on any congressional findings.223 On the opposite
end of the legislative spectrum was the CSA, which was part of a larger
regulatory scheme that regulated an economic activity that was supported by
numerous congressional findings.224
For similar reasons, the Court distinguished Morrison from the present
case.225 In particular, unlike Morrison and Lopez, the majority characterized
the CSA as "quintessentially economic. 226 It referred to the dictionary and
defined "economic" as "the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities., 227 Because the CSA regulates the production, distribution,
and consumption of substances that have an established interstate market,
the majority held that prohibiting the intrastate cultivation or possession was
a rational means of regulating the commerce of that product.228 "Because the
CSA is a statute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, [the
Court's] opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on its constitutionality. 229
219. Id. at 23. The Respondents relied on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Id
220. Id.
221. Id. The majority found this distinction of particular importance because the Court
has often held that "[wihere the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the
reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of
the class." Id. (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 154).
222. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 23-25.
223. Id. at 23.
224. Id. at 24.
225. Id. at 25. Unlike the CSA, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 depended on
state law and did not relate to an economic activity. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 25-26 (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 720 (1996)).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "commodity" as "[a]n article of trade or commerce."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (8th ed. 2004).




c. The "separate and distinct" argument
Next, the majority critiqued the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that, as a
"separate and distinct" class of activities, the private cultivation and use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes was beyond the reach of federal power
under the Commerce Clause. 23" The Court disagreed and concluded that
Congress acted rationally in determining that the use of medicinal marijuana
was part of a larger regulatory scheme. 231' This determination was rational
for a number of reasons: (1) the advice of a physician was irrelevant because
Congress had expressly found that marijuana had no medicinal uses; 23 2 (2)
the exemption for medicinal marijuana would only increase the supply; (3)
there existed a danger of an excess in supply, which at some point could be
used to satisfy recreational demands; (4) the Compassionate Use Act is too
broad and provided physicians with an economic incentive to recommend
marijuana use; and (5) a criminal could take advantage of the system. 233 Fur-
thermore, it would be impossible for this local activity to remain sealed off
from the larger interstate marijuana market.234
Next, the majority discussed Justice O'Connor's argument that medici-
nal marijuana should be distinguished from non-medicinal marijuana and
treated as a separate class of activity.235 The Court concluded, however, that
if it labeled the personal cultivation and use of marijuana as beyond the
"outer limits" of congressional authority, then this rationale could extend to
all locally produced and consumed controlled substances.236 This rationale
would undermine the entire regulatory scheme. 237 Additionally, the majority
concluded that Respondents' use of marijuana "in accordance with state
law" could not act, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, as a limitation on
congressional reach.238
In conclusion, the majority presented the Respondents with two alter-
native avenues of relief.239 First, the Respondents could seek to reclassify
marijuana as a Schedule II drug, pursuant to the CSA, thereby authorizing
230. Id. at 26-27. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined the Respondents' activities
as "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession[,J and use of marijuana for personal
medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in accordance with state law." Id. at 26
(citing Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003)).
231. Id. at 26-27.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 27-29, 31.
234. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 30.
235. Id. at 28.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 29. "The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any con-
flict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail." Id.
239. Id. at 33.
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the medicinal use of marijuana.24° Second, instead of seeking judicial reme-
dies, Respondents could rely on the democratic process to effectuate their
desired use of medicinal marijuana.24'
2. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the majority opin-
ion but wrote separately to better articulate the doctrinal foundation of the
Commerce Clause.242 Justice Scalia recognized the three broad categories
that permit congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.243 Focus-
ing on the "substantial effects" category, Justice Scalia noted that the power
to regulate an intrastate activity does not come from the Commerce Clause
alone but, instead, must also be derived from the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 2" Prior case law had permitted federal regulation of intrastate activi-
ties that are necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate activities in
two circumstances: Congress can devise rules (1) that govern commerce
between states and (2) that aid interstate commerce by dispensing with po-
tential obstructions. 245 The Court limited the "substantial effects" test by
recent decisions that rejected Congress's power to regulate intrastate activity
that was non-economic in nature and that required multiple inferences to
show the activity's effect on interstate commerce.246 Under Lopez, if the
activity is non-economic, it could be regulated as "an essential part of a lar-
ger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. 247 Justice Scalia
concluded that in the event an activity falls within a more general regulatory
scheme, the question for the Court is "whether the means chosen are 'rea-
sonably adapted' to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce
power.
248
240. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 33. Section 811 of the CSA gives the Attorney General, after
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the authority to add, remove,
or reclassify substances within the schedules. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2000).
241. Id.
242. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 33-34. The three categories include the following: (1) the channels of com-
merce, (2) the instrumentalities of commerce, and (3) those "activities that substantially af-
fect" interstate commerce. Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
244. Id. at 34. For Justice Scalia's application of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see
infra Part IV.A.2.b.
245. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 35.
246. Id. at 35-36. Justice Scalia was referring to the recent decisions of Lopez and Morri-
son. Id.
247. Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
248. Id. at 37 (citations omitted).
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a. Distinguishing Lopez and Morrison
Justice Scalia disagreed with the dissents' contention that the Court has
limited Lopez and Morrison to "little more than a drafting guide." '249 Lopez
and Morrison affirmed the distinction that Congress may not regulate purely
intrastate activities based on attenuated effects on interstate markets.25 0 Nei-
ther decision, however, involved Congress's power to regulate intrastate
activity pursuant to a broad, comprehensive regulatory scheme.2
b. Application of the Necessary and Proper Clause
Under Justice Scalia's doctrinal approach, intrastate activities that were
not themselves part of interstate commerce could be regulated by Congress
pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. 2 The Necessary and Proper
Clause requires the Court to apply a two-part test.25 3 First, the means chosen
by Congress must be "appropriate" and "plainly adapted" to the legitimate
end. 4 Second, the means employed by Congress cannot violate any other
right guaranteed by the Constitution. 5 Justice Scalia characterized the ap-
plication of the Necessary and Proper Clause to the Respondents' activities
as "straightforward., 256 Justice Scalia concluded that the prohibition on the
intrastate use of medicinal marijuana was an appropriate and plainly adapted
means of attaining the legitimate goal of the general eradication of mari-
juana in the interstate market because it would be virtually impossible to
distinguish between controlled substances produced intrastate and controlled
substances produced interstate. 7 In addition, Justice Scalia pointed out that
the regulation of the intrastate use of medicinal marijuana would not violate
any other right guaranteed by the Constitution.25
249. Id. at 38.
250. Id.
251. RaichIV, 545 U.S. at 39.
252. Id. at 34-35. Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia argued that under the authority of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress could regulate an intrastate activity that did not
substantially affect interstate commerce. Id.
253. Id. at 39; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
254. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 39.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 39-41.




1. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor was concerned about the "outer limits" of the Com-
merce Clause, not for its own sake, but for the sake of protecting state sov-
ereignty from expanding federal control.259 Justice O'Connor believed that
this case signified the role of states as laboratories.26° Quoting Justice Louis
D. Brandeis, Justice O'Connor wrote, "a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory[,] and try novel and social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. ' 261' After discuss-
ing her initial concerns about federalism, Justice O'Connor examined the
Court's holding in Lopez.262 To Justice O'Connor, the Lopez decision rested
on four factors.2 63 First, the Court recognized that federal regulation of eco-
nomic activity had generally been upheld under the "substantial effects" test,
but in the case of non-economic activities, the "substantial effects" test did
not apply.26 Second, the legislation in Lopez did not have a jurisdictional
element to limit its impact to interstate commerce.265 Third, the Court in
Lopez recognized the importance of congressional findings.266 Finally, the
Court rejected congressional findings that were too attenuated.267 Justice
O'Connor concluded that these factors were indistinguishable from Raich.26 s
a. Comprehensive regulatory scheme
Initially, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the majority relied on two
facts when it upheld the CSA.26 9 First, Congress chose to create a single,
comprehensive act regulating all controlled substances, and, second, Con-
gress chose not to distinguish between the interstate and intrastate cultiva-
tion, possession, and use of marijuana.270 Justice O'Connor expressed con-
259. Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor declared that the principles of
our federalist system would require that California's experiment with medicinal marijuana be
protected. Id.
260. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 42.
261. Id. (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
262. Id. at 43-44.
263. Id. at 44.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 44.
267. Id. at 44-45.





cern with the majority's approval of an all-encompassing statute, which ef-
fectively removed any meaningful limits on the Commerce Clause. 7' For
example, the majority distinguished Lopez on the ground that one statute
was brief and the other was comprehensive.272 By making this distinction,
Justice O'Connor described the Lopez decision as "nothing more than a
drafting guide. 273 Justice O'Connor concluded that the Court must establish
"objective markers" to confine Congress's reach under the commerce power
and protect the notion of enumerated powers.274 One such "objective
marker" could be to distinguish the medical and non-medical uses of drugs
as distinct and separate activities."' Thus, Justice O'Connor focused on the
local cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medical purposes as a
distinguishable activity under the CSA.276
b. Substantial effects test
Once Justice O'Connor defined the relevant activity, she focused on
whether the activity was "economic" and, in the aggregate, whether it sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce.277 Justice O'Connor argued that the
local use of medicinal marijuana was not an economic activity, and, even if
it were, the activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce.278 Jus-
tice O'Connor opposed the majority's broad definition of "economic activ-
ity. 2 79 The majority's definition "draw[s] no line at all," and would include
everything as economic.280 Justice O'Connor relied on Lopez and Morrison,
which suggested that economic activity should be limited to commercial
activity.2"' This is of particular importance because both the Government
and Respondents agreed that the marijuana and the supplies to grow it were
271. Id.
272. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 45-46.
273. Id. at 46. Justice O'Connor even suggested that, in Lopez, if Congress would have
described the crime as "transfer or possession of a firearm anywhere in the nation," according
to the majority's decision, the statute would have been upheld. Id.
274. Id. at 47. "The task is to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate
more than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than everything
(by declining to let Congress set the terms of analysis)." Id.
275. Id. at 48.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 49.
278. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 49.
279. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that the "Court uses a dictionary definition ... to skirt
the real problem of drawing a meaningful line between 'what is national and what is local."'
Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).




never in the stream of commerce.282 Justice O'Connor concluded by pointing
out that Lopez made it clear that possession, by itself, is not commerce.283
Even if the majority correctly determined that the private cultivation of
marijuana for medicinal purposes was economic, Justice O'Connor pointed
to the absence of congressional findings regarding whether such activity
substantially affected interstate commerce. 84 Justice O'Connor claimed that
any attempt by Congress to invade traditional states' rights should be spe-
cifically justified.285 In response to the majority's argument about the impact
of the Compassionate Use Act on interstate commerce,286 Justice O'Connor
admitted that these arguments were plausible but, without evidence, were
merely conclusory statements.287
c. Distinguishing Wickard
Next, Justice O'Connor distinguished the Court's holding in
Wickard.288 First, Justice O'Connor contrasted the CSA's "limitless asser-
tion of power" with the statute in Wickard, which exempted some small-
scale, non-commercial wheat farming.289 Justice O'Connor concluded that,
contrary to the majority's opinion, the Court in Wickard did not assert that
all production of wheat, no matter how small in scale, would be considered
economic and, therefore, within Congress's reach.29' Additionally, contrary
to the majority, the Court in Wickard examined the actual effect of locally
cultivated commodities on the interstate market.29' In Wickard, as opposed
to the present case, there was specific evidence of the activities' substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 92 Finally, despite the majority's claim that
the congressional findings were similar in both cases, Justice O'Connor dis-
agreed and characterized the congressional findings in the CSA as "bare
declarations" that were "too vague and unspecific. 293
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 51.
285. Id. at 52.
286. Id. at 53-54. The majority argued that the California statute could (1) be exploited
by criminals, (2) promote overproduction, or (3) lead to difficulties in law enforcement. Id
287. Id. at 56-57.
288. Id. at 53-57. Justice O'Connor noted that the decision in Wickard has been charac-
terized as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intra-
state activity." Id. at 51 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)).
289. Id.
290. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 51.
291. Id. at 53.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 54, 55. "They amount to nothing more than legislative insistence that the regu-
lation of controlled substances must be absolute." Id at 54.
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2. Justice Thomas's Dissenting Opinion
Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Thomas stated that if the commerce
power could regulate the Respondents' marijuana, "then it can regulate vir-
tually anything-and the Federal Government is no longer one of limited
and enumerated powers."294 Justice Thomas defined the local cultivation and
consumption of medicinal marijuana as neither "commercial" nor "neces-
sary and proper" for carrying out Congress's restriction on the interstate
drug trade.29
a. Traditional notions of commerce
Initially, Justice Thomas distinguished the Respondents' activities from
the Court's traditional notions of commerce.296 Justice Thomas noted that
the text, structure, and history of the Constitution suggest that the term
"commerce" meant selling, buying, bartering, or transporting commodi-
ties.297 Respondents had not bought or sold marijuana, nor had they ever
crossed state lines.298 Thus, according to Justice Thomas, the Respondents'
specific activities could not be defined as "commerce. 299 Furthermore, be-
cause the CSA completely bans the possession or manufacture of controlled
substances, including those activities that are purely intrastate in nature,
Justice Thomas concluded that the CSA exceeded congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause as applied to the Respondents' conduct.3"0
b. The Necessary and Proper Clause
Justice Thomas then considered whether Congress had the power to
enact laws that were "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution
Congress's authority to regulate the drug trade. 30 ' To invoke the Necessary
and Proper Clause, Congress must meet a two-part test that requires (1) that
the means be "appropriate" and "plainly adapted" to a legitimate, enumer-
ated power and (2) that the means cannot be "prohibited" by the Constitu-
tion.3"2
294. Id. at 57-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 58.
296. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 58-59.
297. Id. at 58.
298. Id. at 59.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 59-60.
302. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 60.
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First, Justice Thomas addressed whether the means were "plainly
adapted" to the regulation of drug trafficking. °3 Justice Thomas concluded
that the means had to be more than reasonable, to wit, "'there must be an,
obvious, simple, and direct relation' between the intrastate ban and the regu-
lation of interstate commerce. '' 3°4 Justice Thomas admitted that, on its face,
the ban of intrastate cultivation and possession was plainly adapted to stop-
ping the flow of marijuana across state lines.305 Justice Thomas, however,
argued that the Respondents, as medical marijuana users, were part of a
separate and distinct class that was readily distinguishable under the CSA.306
Justice Thomas relied on the specific provisions of the Compassionate Use
Act to distinguish Respondents' conduct from that of the ordinary intrastate
cultivators and users.307 Furthermore, Congress did not present any evidence
supporting its claim that the regulation of purely intrastate possession by
medicinal users could impact the interstate drug trade.3°8 In sum, Congress
did not show that the regulation of Respondents' activities was a necessary
means of effectuating its legitimate end of eradicating the interstate drug
trade.30 9
Second, Justice Thomas examined whether the application of the CSA
to Respondents' activities would violate another right implicit within the
Constitution.310 Justice Thomas determined that the use of the Necessary and
Proper Clause to regulate purely intrastate, non-commercial activities would
confer on Congress a "police power" over the states. 31' Additionally, Con-
gress should not be able to use the Necessary and Proper Clause to "subvert
basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty., 3 2 Thus, Justice Tho-
mas concluded that the regulation of locally cultivated marijuana for medi-
cal purposes would encroach on the traditional state "police power.',313
303. Id. at 61.
304. Id. (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 61-62. Justice Thomas reframed the question as "[W]hether the intrastate ban
is 'necessary and proper' as applied to medical marijuana users like respondents." Id. at 61.
307. Id. at 62. Contrary to the majority, Justice Thomas argued that there was no reason
to believe that the Compassionate Use Act would not provide adequate limitations and safe-
guards for the medicinal use of marijuana. Id. at 63.








c. Addressing the majority's opinion
Justice Thomas then addressed what he considered "fundamental
flaws" in the majority's reasoning.314 First, Justice Thomas described the
majority's use of the "substantial effects" test as "rootless. '3 5 By expanding
the relevant activities, the majority established a malleable rule that defined
a class of activities in a general way, thereby avoiding whether a particular
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.3 16 Second, by defining
economic activity in its broadest sense, Justice Thomas contended that the
majority evaded "even that modest restriction on federal power" that held
that Congress could not regulate non-economic activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce.3" 7 Justice Thomas asserted that the majority's
attempt to circumvent even the narrowest of limitations made a mockery of
Madison's assurance that the federal authority is "few and defined," ''while
those of the States are 'numerous and indefinite.' 3,1 8 Justice Thomas con-
cluded that the only way to establish some stability in the area of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence would be to reformulate a new definition of "Com-
merce ... among the several States."3 9
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich can
be characterized as two-fold. First and foremost, the decision casts doubt on
the notion that Lopez initiated a broad shift in Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.32° Second, the decision ratified the continued federal prosecution of
people who, through the democratic process, voted to enact state legislation
authorizing the limited use of marijuana.
314. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 67.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 67-68. According to Justice Thomas, the appropriate question "is whether
Congress's legislation is essential to the regulation of interstate commerce itself' and "not
whether the legislation extends only to economic activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce." Id.
317. Id. at 68-69.
318. Id. at 69 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison)).
319. Id. at 71. Justice Thomas suggested the following definition: "Congress may regulate
interstate commerce-not things that affect it, even when summed together, unless truly
,necessary and proper' to regulating interstate commerce." Id.
320. Readers questioning the importance of this issue need look no further than the odd
blend of progressive and conservative states filing amicus briefs on behalf of the Respon-
dents. See Brief of the States of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Ashcroft v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454); Brief of the
States of California, Maryland, and Washington as Amici Curiae in Support of Angel
McClary Raich, et al., Ashcroft v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454).
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This section first examines the impact of Raich on Lopez and the
Court's recent attempt to rely on principles of federalism to reestablish some
limitation on the scope of the Commerce Clause.32 1 Next, this section exam-
ines the impact of Raich on Angel Raich, Diane Monson, and the future of
the state-authorized use of medicinal marijuana.22
A. Lopez, Morrison, and the Federal Regulation of Intrastate Activities
"Was United States v. Lopez a constitutional freak? Or did it signify
that the Commerce Clause still imposes some meaningful limits on congres-
sional power?" '323 The Lopez decision has been characterized as "[a] hall-
mark of the Rehnquist Court... , resulting in decisions that demand[] a new
respect for the sovereignty of the states and place[] corresponding restric-
tions on the powers of Congress." '324 In Lopez, a five-justice majority applied
federalism principles and established a new bright-line rule: "Where eco-
nomic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulat-
ing that activity will be sustained.""3 But if the regulated activity is not
commercial (or economic in nature)-and is not part of a larger regulatory
scheme that is commercial itself-the legislation will be struck down as an
unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power.326 For the first time since
pre-New Deal jurisprudence, the Court interpreted the Commerce Clause in
a way so as to preserve the delicate balance between "what is national and
what is local., 327 In 2000, the Court reaffirmed this rule, signifying the
Court's intention to limit Congress's authority over those activities consid-
ered intrastate or local.328 Prior to Raich, however, the Court left two ques-
tions unanswered. What does "economic by nature" mean? 329 And, how will
the "substantial effects" test be applied to those activities that are not eco-
nomic themselves but are part of a larger regulatory scheme? 33° In answering
321. See infra Part V.A.
322. See infra Part V.B.
323. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
324. Greenhouse, supra note 10.
325. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
326. Id.
327. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 811-17.
328. Morrison, 521 U.S. at 610.
329. See Jennifer L. Wethington, Note, Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Rem-
edy Exceeds Congress 's Powers to Regulate Interstate Commerce, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REv. 485, 508 (2001). The majority relied on the broadest interpretation of the word "eco-
nomic," which encompasses any activities that have an effect on commercial goods. Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 49-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Raich IV).
330. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. The majority concluded that the classification of marijuana
under the CSA was one of many "essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regu-
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these two questions, the Raich decision has effectively undermined the so-
called "federalism revolution," and as Justice O'Connor warned, the major-
ity's interpretation of Lopez and Morrison will surely invite increased fed-
eral regulation.33" '
So the question becomes, what is left of Lopez and the so-called "fed-
eralism revolution?" The Court in Raich did not overrule Lopez, Morrison,
or any of the prior Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Instead, the Court at-
tempted to harmonize prior precedents with its holding in Raich. Despite the
Court's continued adoption of the federalism-based limitation to the com-
merce power, the Court's interpretation significantly narrowed its applica-
tion. First, the majority in Raich reaffirmed the rational basis standard.332
Second, the Court interpreted Lopez in a way that effectively eviscerated its
limitations.333 For example, in response to the majority's interpretation of
"economic," Justice O'Connor correctly stated that "[t]o draw the line wher-
ever private activity affects the demand for market goods is to draw no line
at all, and to declare everything economic. 334 In the end, Lopez will likely
become nothing more than a drafting guide for federal legislation, an exam-
ple of how not to write a law.
B. Angel Raich, Diane Monson, and the Future of the Compassionate Use
Acts
The real victims of the Court's decision were Angel Raich, Diane Mon-
son, and the citizens of the ten states that ratified the limited use of mari-
lated." Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 24. Thus, as long as Congress included the non-economic activ-
ity within its larger regulatory legislation, it can regulate an activity that is neither economic
itself nor part of interstate commerce. See id.
331. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 46-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Soon after the Court handed
down its decision, three closely watched cases were either vacated or denied certiorari in light
of the Raich holding. See United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11 th Cir. 2005), vacated by,
125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005) (vacating and remanding the Court of Appeals of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's holding that a federal law, which made it a crime to produce or possess child pornogra-
phy, exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Stewart,
348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated by, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) (vacating and remanding
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's decision, which relied on Lopez and Morrison and re-
versed a federal criminal conviction for the possession of a homemade machine gun); GDF
Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2898
(2005) (denying certiorari for a real estate developer who asserted a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge against the Endangered Species Act on the ground that Congress exceeded its authority
to protect a small species of insect that lived entirely within a single state).
332. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 2. "[T]he Court need not determine whether respondents'
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding." Id.
333. Id. at 25-27.
334. Id. at 50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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juana for medicinal purposes. For those suffering debilitating and life-
threatening illnesses, this decision was more than a case about state sover-
eignty; it was about survival. Shortly after the decision came down, Angel
Raich emphasized what was at stake by stating that "[i]f I did not use can-
nabis, I would die." '335
Fortunately for these patients and many others like them, the Raich de-
cision was relatively narrow. It addressed only the issue of whether Con-
gress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by prohibiting the
intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana.336 Thus, the Court's hold-
ing in Raich did not address the preemption of the state statute, preserving
the validity of the CSA.33 7 The Raich decision makes it clear that federal
authorities can prosecute patients possessing and consuming marijuana for
medicinal purposes, irrespective of a state statute authorizing the patients
use. The CSA and similar statutes, however, will continue to protect patients
against prosecution by state authorities. Robert Raich, Angel Raich's hus-
band and attorney, stated that patients using medical marijuana should "rest
assured that it remains safe" because "[ninety-nine] percent of marijuana
arrests take place at the local level. 338
Rick Behring, Jr.*
335. Tony Mauro, United States Supreme Court Roundup: Ruling in Medical Maryuana
Case Marks Shiftfor States'Rights, 180 N.J. L.J. 989 (2005). Although disappointed by the
outcome, Angel Raich told reporters that the war was not over, and she planned to continue
using marijuana. Id.
336. Raich IV, 545 U.S. at 5.
337. Marijuana Policy Project, In All 10 Medical Mariuana States, Officials Say "Noth-
ing 's Changed" Since Gonzales v. Raich, available at
http://www.mpp.org/raich/officials.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2005). Attorney Generals from
all ten states authorizing the use of medicinal marijuana issued statements endorsing the
opinion that Raich would not overrule state-initiated, medical-marijuana laws. Id.
338. Mauro, supra note 335. Similarly, Boston University law professor Randy Barnett
stated that "[t]he ruling has absolutely nothing to do with the continued existence of the
[CSA]." Id.
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